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United States v. Cooper: BAIL 
REFORM ACT REQUIRES NOnCE 
BEFORE PRESCRIBING 
MANDATORY ENHANCED 
SENTENCE 
In United States v. Cooper, 827 F .2d 991 
(4th Cir. 1987), the court of appeals held 
that a person convicted of a crime, while 
released on bail pending appeal of another 
crime, may not receive the mandatory 
enhanced sentence prescribed in 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3147 without first receiving notice of the 
possibility of such enhanced sentence. Sec-
tion 3147 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
(hereinafter the" Act") provides that a per-
son convicted of an offense while released 
pending appeal of a separate crime receive 
a mandatory sentence in addition to that 
prescribed for the substantive offense. 
Vernon Cooper was convicted and sen-
tenced in early 1984 for income tax eva-
sion and was released on bail pending 
appeal. Cooper did not receive notice, that 
if convicted of an offense while out on 
bail, he could receive an enhanced sen-
tence. On July 7, 1986, while still released 
on bail, Cooper was convicted of posses-
sion of cocaine and possession of a firearm 
by a convited felon. The government 
sought an enhanced sentence for the 1986 
conviction, pursuant to § 3147, which 
reads: 
A person convicted of an offense com-
mitted while released under this chap-
ter shall be sentenced, in addition to 
the sentence prescribed for the offense 
to-
(1) a term of imprisonment of not 
less than two years and not more 
than ten years if the offense is a 
felony; or 
(2) a term of imprisonment of not less 
than ninety days and not more than 
one year if the offense is a misde-
meanor. 
A term of imprisonment imposed 
under this section shall be consecutive 
to any other sentence of imprison-
ment. 
18 U.S.c. § 3147 (1984). 
The district court, upon motion by 
Cooper to prohibit the enhancement of 
penalties, ruled as a matter of statutory 
construction that § 3147 was inapplicable 
to Cooper. The court stated that § 3142(h) 
of the Act requires that notice be given to 
the releasee, prior to release, of the possi-
bility of sentence enhancement if he is con-
victed of another crime while on release. 
Section 3142(hX2) orders, in part, that the 
judicial officer authorizing release advise 
the person being released of "the penalties 
for violating a condition of release .... " 
18 U.S.c. § 3142 (h)(2) (1984). The district 
court based its conclusion on two factors. 
First, the court held that Congress' silence 
in the Act on the effect of enhanced penal-
ties upon failure of a judicial officer to give 
notice of the enhancement provisions 
indicates that § 3142(h) applied to § 3147. 
Second, because the Act is penal in nature 
and is ambiguous as to whether notice of 
the enhanced penalties is required, the rule 
of lenity would be applied. Cooper, 827 
F.2d at 994. Thus, Cooper could not 
receive the enhanced sentence since he did 
not receive notice prior to being released. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed. The court based its deci-
sion in large part on the grounds of the dis-
trict court, and found even "stronger 
evidence" that would lead to the conclu-
sion that "congress did not intend § 3147 
to apply when the notice requirements of 
§ 3142 were not fulfilled. Id. 
The court of appeals examined the legis-
lative history of the Act and found twO 
factors persuasive. First, it found that the 
Act was based in large part on the then 
existing District of Columbia Release and 
Detention Statute, D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 23-1321( c). That statute requires that a 
judicial officer authorizing release "inform 
such person of the penalties applicable to 
violation of the conditions of release," and 
shall warn him of the enhancement of 
penalties for conviction of a crime com-
mitted while on release. Id. However, § 
23-1328 (b) of that Act specifically pro-
vides that "the giving of a warning to the 
person released of the penalties imposed 
by this section shall not be a prerequisite 
to application of [the enhanced penalties] 
section." D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1328 (b) 
(1981). Contrary to this provision, the fed-
eral statute omits such language. The court 
of appeals refused to "presume" that the 
ommission in § 3147 occurred as a result of 
oversight. Cooper, 827 F.2d at 994. Thus, 
Congress intended that notice of possible 
enhanced sentence be given, if the releasee 
is to subsequently receive a greater sen-
tence. 
The court concluded that Congress did 
not intend § 3147 to apply to a case 
"where the warning was not given and, 
indeed could not be given because it was 
not yet a part of the law." Id. at 995. Thus, 
a judicial officer who is authorizing release 
pending appeal must give the releasee 
notice that he may receive an enhanced 
sentence if he is convicted of another 
crime while released. Unless such notice is 
given, the person may not receive an 
enhanced sentence. 
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